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All in the Family: When Will Internal Discussions Be
Labeled Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy?
I. INTRODUCTION
At no time has what the Third Circuit picturesquely calls the
"cloak and dagger" conception of conspiracy obtained in the
antitrust field. "The picture of conspiracy as a meeting by
twilight of a trio of sinister persons with pointed hats close
together belongs to a darker age" -an age long preceding
1890.'
Yet the law of conspiracy cannot be entirely severed from its
origins, any more than can the law of antitrust. With the enactment
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act' in 1890, a young industrial society
sought to remedy its economic evils, drawing in part on the ancient
law of conspiracy.3 The dynamic nature of the economic setting in
which the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to be enforced has sometimes
seemed at odds with the legal formalism of the conspiracy concept,
creating thorny problems for judges and litigants who still must
struggle with the long shadows cast by those "pointed hats."
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act in § § 1 and 34 bars conspiratorial
or multi-party conduct in restraint of trade, but does not prohibit
1. Handler, Contract, Combination or Conspiracy, 3 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 38, 41
(1953).
2. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209, as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
3. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ....
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty ....
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970), states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District
of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the
District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and
any State or States or foreign nations, is declared illegal.
4. Discussion here will focus upon § 1 because of its more common applicability, but
generally what is said regarding that section applies to § 3 as well.
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restraints of trade created by single entities. Section 2, on the other
hand, reaches monopolistic conduct per se, whether engaged in by
a single entity or a combination.' This difference in the sections has
been the source of much scholarly analysis and speculation, but all
agree that the statutory language is a monument in vagueness.8
Because certain conduct appears to fall between these sections,
somewhere beyond the reach of either, the understandable tempta-
tion for prosecutors has been to seek a modified application of con-
spiracy concepts.7 One such modification is the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine.
Variously termed "thin conspiracy," 8 "intra-corporate conspir-
acy," 9 "bathtub conspiracy"' 0 and other characterizations,' 1 the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in all its manifestations in-
volves a finding of illegal conspiracy within a single business enter-
prise," as between subsidiary corporations of the same parent or
between a subsidiary and its parent. Although the term "intra-
corporate" is commonly used interchangeably with "intra-
enterprise," its use here is restricted to its more natural meaning,
i.e., that branch of the intra-enterprise doctrine dealing with activ-
ity within a single corporation. "Intra-enterprise conspiracy" will be
used herein to refer to conspiracies involving more than one corpora-
tion within a single business enterprise.
5. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act §§ 1-3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely Between a Corporation and Its Offi-
cers Acting on Its Behalf in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section
One of the Sherman Act?, 11 FED. B.J. 130, 134 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Kramer];
Krause, The Multi-Corporate International Business Under Section One of the Sherman
Act-Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Revisited, 17 Bus. LAWYER 912, 914 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Krause]; Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743 (1950).
7. Another reason often suggested for the attempt to stretch traditional conspiracy con-
cepts is that of prosecutorial convenience. A lighter burden of proof or longer period of
limitations may provoke resort to § 1, which requires a conspiracy, rather than § 2, which
does not, even though the challenged conduct may clearly be within the prohibition of the
latter section. See, e.g., 63 YALE L.J. 372, 373-74 (1954).
8. E.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st
Cir. 1974).
9. E.g., Wilberding, An Ominous Warning for Antitrust Law: The Disposition of the
"Bathtub" Conspiracy-As Applied to Unincorporated Divisions-May Have Left a Tell-
Tale Ring Around the Tub, 32 OoO ST. L.J. 43, 45 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Wilberding].
10. Id.
11. E.g., 43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 786 (1968).
12. Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MONT.
L. REV. 158 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Bamdt].
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The intra-corporate branch of the doctrine has been widely dis-
credited, although the Supreme Court has never settled the issue of
its existence. 3 The broader intra-enterprise doctrine is alive and
flourishing, with the blessing of the Supreme Court, 4 yet its wisdom
is hotly contested and its scope unclear. This "intra-enterprise"
branch of the doctrine will be the focus of this study.
Exhaustive examinations of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine have appeared in the legal periodicals over the past twenty-
five years; thus, it is not the aim of this comment to focus once more
on the doctrine's evolution or its propriety. After a very brief over-
view of the conflicting rationales of the proponents and opponents
of the doctrine, a cross-section of cases will be reviewed to determine
whether there is a tendency to cluster around possible "exceptions"
or limitations to the doctrine. As the area is in a state of flux, no
ultimate answers will be offered-only suggestions as to the patterns
which appear to exist.
II. CONSPIRACY WITHIN A SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: AN IDEA
WHOSE TIME HAS COME - OR HERESY?
To the proponents of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, it
represents enlightenment. Most who favor the intra-enterprise
branch of the doctrine would carry it still further into the intra-
corporate sphere. 5 They note, first, that the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act nowhere mandates that the corporation be the conspiring unit."
The Act simply requires a conspiracy (for § 1 violations) and since
corporate agents and officers are independent legal entities, these
individuals may conspire among themselves on the corporation's
behalf to restrain trade. 7 On the intra-enterprise scale, the corpo-
rate agents who may conspire (at least under this rationale) are
incorporated subsidiaries, rather than individuals."
13. See, e.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 643 n.9 (9th Cir. 1969).
14. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
15. See, e.g., Barndt, supra note 12.
16. Id.
17. "Legal units do not coincide with economic units and the single-trader may conspire
with itself." Note, The Sherman Act and Multi-Corporate Single-Traders: Competition
Among Affiliates? 100 U. PA. L. Ray. 1006, 1011-12 (1952).
18. In one case, unincorporated divisions were found capable of conspiracy by the district
court, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The lower court had looked beyond the fact that the
1975
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It has been argued as a matter of statutory construction, that the
word "conspiracy" in § 1 must be read as in § 2, that is, the substan-
tive offense was intended to be made unlawful in both."9 This argu-
ment concludes that in any event the vagueness of the statutory
language was surely designed by Congress to permit judicial adapta-
tion to changes in economic reality. A failure to extend the conspir-
acy concept to cooperative conduct within a single corporation or
multicorporate enterprise would provide a "loophole," inviting such
enterprises to engage freely in anticompetitive conduct."
Those who favor the doctrine reject the argument that it irration-
ally and unfairly discriminates against corporations that do busi-
ness through incorporated subsidiaries rather than unincorporated
divisions, which serve the same functions but which cannot con-
spire.2 1 The reply is that: (1) perhaps the doctrine should be ex-
tended to encompass divisions, and (2) simply because some busi-
nesses enjoy a loophole does not require that others be permitted the
benefit of the same loophole.2 2 The proponents also rebuff the argu-
ment that the per se aspect of § 123 will cause normal daily decision-
making between parent and subsidiary to be condemned as unlaw-
ful. They reply that the per se rule may be relaxed in intra-
enterprise cases in favor of the "rule of reason."24 The approach
ultimately proposed by the doctrine's adherents is to ask first if an
unreasonable restraint of trade has occurred. If the answer is affirm-
divisions were not legal entities, in order to get at their practical autonomy in daily opera-
tions. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915
(D. Hawaii 1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
19. Kramer, supra note 6, at 134-35. If this analysis is correct, most problems in finding
a conspiracy that fits traditional definitions can obviously be bypassed, since the "restraint
of trade" is itself a crime, even if engaged in by a single entity.
20. Id. at 141.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. Barndt, supra note 12, at 187.
23. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act normally applies only to unreasonable restraints of
trade. However, certain activities (e.g., price-fixing, group boycotts and market division) are
so abusive that they are considered unreasonable restraints of trade per se, regardless of the
actual degree of impact on commerce.
24. E.g., Comment, Corporate Liability for Intra-Corporate Conspiracy in Restraint of
Trade, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 248, [hereinafter cited as Corporate Liability]:
It seems improbable, however, that the concept of per se violations would be applied
indiscriminately in the intra-enterprise or intra-corporate context. Since the inception
of the Sherman Act, the courts have consistently recognized that only unreasonable
restraints of trade constitute a violation. . . .Such limitations in the application of
the per se rules have been recognized by scholars . ...
Id. at 253 (footnote omitted).
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ative, § 1 can in most cases be stretched to reach the situation.25
To those who oppose the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, it
represents pure heresy to established legal thought. Moreover, it is
an instrument of uncertain range, creating persistent feelings of
paranoia in counsel who must advise corporate management of the
legal status of their company's dealings through its subsidiaries.
The rationale of the opponents is premised on the fact that § 1,
unlike § 2, requires the action of more than one party."6 The oppo-
nents argue that where a single business enterprise does business
through incorporated subsidiaries, these separate corporations are,
in economic fact, functioning as one enterprise in most cases. The
subsidiaries, although distinct legal entities, are in actuality only
"agents" or instrumentalities of a single business.27 It is emphasized
that Congress obviously was concerned about cooperative or con-
spiratorial conduct between separate business unitss and that in
circumventing the requirement for such multi-party conduct, the
courts have subverted the legislative directive, effectively reading
the conspiracy requirement out of the statute.29
The opponents further argue that the uncertainty which the doc-
trine has created regarding the legality of routine corporate
decision-making is intolerable in a criminal statute3 This same
25. E.g., Barndt, supra note 12, at 198.
One writer summarized in this manner:
The true single-trader defense is not concerned with conspiracy at all. It is
grounded in the proposition that, absent monopoly, restraints within the confines of a
single enterprise, i.e., internal price and distribution policies, have no harmful effects
on competition. And it would seem to make little difference whether the business were
[sic] conducted in single- or multi-corporate form, as long as a common management
controlled throughout. The crucial question is whether trade of third parties is re-
strained. This depends on the effect of defendants' conduct on suppliers, customers,
and competitors.
63 YALE L.J. 372, 388 (1954) (emphasis added).
26. See note 3 supra.
27. See, e.g., Kempf, Bathtub Conspiracies: Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent Brew?
24 Bus. LAWYER 173 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kempf].
28. Sprunk, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 9 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 20, 25 (1956).
29. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted):
The theory that parent can conspire with subsidiary, or that illegal concert of action
can be found within the confines of a single corporation, places in jeopardy the vast
majority of all American business. . . . Serious concern has been expressed that once
the law ignores the obvious fact that parent and subsidiary constitute but a single
economic entity, then no form of business organization, except the sole proprietorship
with no employees, can escape the possible thrust of the theory.
30. Id. at 22.
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uncertainty has also led to a very real fear that the doctrine may
be arbitrarily invoked by prosecutors as a method of harrassment,
or by private plaintiffs with an ax to grind or simply made greedy
by the sweet scent of treble damages."
The opponents of the doctrine are particularly nettled by the
proponents' battle-cry: "substance, not form,""2 when, in fact, in
the case of intra-enterprise conspiracy, it is form which has been
exalted in order to reach within a single business technically, and
only technically, composed of more than one corporation. At the
same time, a business operated through unincorporated divisions is
left untouched. As many legitimate business reasons exist for
choosing a subsidiary rather than divisional structure, no sound
reason for the discrimination is apparent.3 4
At the root of many of the fears which the doctrine has engendered
is the per se concept that exists under § 1. Normally, Sherman Anti-
Trust Act violations are found only in unreasonable restraints of
trade 5.3  However, certain activities have been found so abusive as
31. Corporate Liability, supra note 24, at 254-55.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947). The "substance,
not form" rationale of the intra-enterprise conspiracy proponents is as follows: The antitrust
laws are concerned with substance, not form. Since businesses have chosen to accept the
benefits of multi-corporate operation, they must bear the burden of exposure to antitrust
liability. They cannot hide behind the argument that there can be no conspiracy without a
plurality of actors, since this argument is based on a mere formal technicality.
33. See, e.g., Kempf, supra note 27, at 177; Krause, supra note 6, at 929.
An oft-quoted paraphrase of the "substance versus form" rationale of United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 404 (7th Cir. 1941), is as follows:
The court's reasoning was stated in three sentences:
"Nor can the appellants enjoy the benefits of separate corporate identity and escape
the consequences of an illegal combination in restraint of trade by insisting that they
are in effect a single trader. The test of illegality under the Sherman Act is not so much
the particular form of business organization effected, as it is the presence or absence
of restraint of trade and commerce. But even if the single trader doctrine were applica-
ble, it would not help the appellants."
One might read this as: "Form matters. Form does not really matter. Even if form did
really matter, you're stuck anyhow."
McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 Va.
L. Rev. 183, 190-91 (1955) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as McQuade].
34. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 6, at 912; McQuade, supra note 33, at 186. Tax reasons
are undoubtedly a primary reason for selection of a subsidiary structure. Others frequently
cited include increased managerial flexibility, maintenance of the good will associated with
an acquired business, and promotion of employee morale by creation of more executive
positions. Still others will be suggested by a perusal of the above-cited articles.
35. Sunderland, Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field, 3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 60,
61 (1951).
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to be considered inherently unreasonable, without regard to their
actual impact on commerce a.3 The idea that a pricing arrangement
adopted by a parent and subsidiary may be held illegal per se has
understandably caused some consternation.37
Opponents of the doctrine are fond of pointing to its widespread
unenforcement as evidence of its shortcomings. The doctrine's pro-
ponents prefer to view this under-enforcement as evidence that
common sense will be utilized by the courts to apply the doctrine
only where appropriate. All agree that a "conspiracy" within a sin-
gle enterprise cannot be blindly subjected to the same set of stan-
dards as a conspiracy between independent competitors."8
In view of this universally-felt need to establish some limits on the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, but widely diverging opinion
as to where these limits should be imposed, lower courts have neces-
sarily engaged in an ad hoc balancing of the considerations involved.
The following review of cases is premised on the belief that no court
will treat all affiliates as independents, nor every agreement be-
tween them as a conspiracy. Some courts, convinced of the sound-
ness of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, will apply it in most
cases but find "exceptions" in compelling circumstances. Others,
less fond of the doctrine, will apply it only when first convinced that
the particular facts fit within tightly defined limits. Accordingly,
some of the limitations discussed below are phrased as "excep-
tions," carved from the generally-applicable rule, while others are
discussed as limitations serving to confine the rule itself to a very
narrow range of cases.
III. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THE DOCTRINE BE APPLIED?
A. The Competitor Limitation
Of the possible limitations on the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
36. Id. at 63-66.
37. McQuade, supra note 33, at 215:
To some extent, at least, the intra-enterprise theory probably evolved from a groping
attempt to solve the problem created by the existence of these areas between the loose
and the tight organization. To have sensed the problem is good. To have tried to solve
it with Section 1 is not. Section 1 was not designed for the job. Its per se characteristic
is antithetical to the type of judgments required in these mid-areas. There must be
some opportunity to show economic justification.
38. Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43
N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 21 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Willis & Pitofsky]; Carlston, Basic Anti-
trust Concepts, 53 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1044 (1955).
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trine, the competitor limitation rule has much articulate and broad-
based support. The single most comprehensive discussion of this
limitation and most influential, if judicial citation is any indicator,"
is a 1968 article by Willis and Pitofsky.10 Briefly stated, this rule
would limit application of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
to cases wherein affiliated corporations have publicly adopted a
competitive posture.4
The leading case is Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc.,4 which involved the per se offense of price-fixing.43 A
liquor wholesaler brought a private treble damage action against
Seagram and Calvert distilleries and their sales organizations, alleg-
ing that defendants had conspired to sell only to those wholesalers
who would sell at or below maximum prices set by defendants.
Defendants contended that they as "mere instrumentalities of a
single manufacturing-merchandizing unit"" were incapable of con-
spiring."3 In rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court stated
that common ownership did not remove the impact of the antitrust
laws and noted: "The rule is especially applicable where, as here,
respondents hold themselves out as competitors."' 6
As Willis and Pitofsky note, the Court's language leaves several
questions unanswered, such as the nature of the harm done, since
apparently no one was actually misled into believing that Seagram
and Calvert were truly independent competitors.47 Those authors
39. E.g., Beckman v. Walter Kidde Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), afj'd,
451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971)(per curiam), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972).
40. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38.
41. Where the affiliates have never adopted a competitive stance, the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine would only be applied in such comparatively rare instances as abuse of
the parent-subsidiary structure.
42. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
43. Another noteworthy aspect of the case was its declaration that fixing maximum, as
well as minimum, prices violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Id. at 213.
44. 340 U.S. at 215.
45. The defendants were related as follows:
Distillers Corp
Seagram & Sons, Indiana
Seagram, Sales Calvert
Calvert, Sales
Each company was an incorporated subsidiary of the company directly above it on the
diagram.
46. 340 U.S. at 215.
47. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 37, 38. Those authors suggest that the case is in
line with certain Federal Trade Commission precedent: FTC v. A. A. Berry Seed Co., 2 F.T.C.
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conclude that a competitor limitation is reasonable, since the mis-
leading "holding out" of a competitive posture may indeed contrib-
ute to anticompetitive results, while numerous legitimate business
goals could be served if affiliations between apparent competitors
were disclosed.4"
Other commentators have agreed with Willis and Pitofsky in their
reading of Kiefer-Stewart. In fact, one well-respected scholar in the
field viewed the case as of limited significance since he believed it
held only that affiliates may conspire when they present themselves
as independent competitors.4" Still others have noted that other
Supreme Court decisions, Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &
Smith Co. 5° and Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,5 may
be read consistently with such a limitation.
Sunkist involved agricultural cooperatives formed by groups of
citrus growers. The Court declined to find the parent, Sunkist, cap-
able of conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Exchange
Lemon and Exchange Orange, in violation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, §§ 1 and 2. Although the Court placed great emphasis
on the exemption from antitrust liability granted agricultural coop-
eratives pursuant to § 6 of the Clayton Act and § 1 of the Capper-
Volstead Act those statutory provisions did not necessarily dictate
the result, 5 nor is the Court's holding so restricted. The Court
stated:
427 (1920); FTC v. Armour & Co., 1 F.T.C. 430 (1919); FTC v. Fleischmann Co., 1 F.T.C.
119 (1918); and at least one district court case of old vintage, under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act: United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256
U.S. 706 (1921).
48. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 38.
49. McQuade, supra note 33, at 207. Other commentators agreeing with the possibility of
a limited reading of Kiefer-Stewart include Krause, supra note 6, at 926; and Wilberding,
supra note 9, at 51.
50. 370 U.S. 19 (1962), cited by Gold, Hawaiian Oke: Kiefer-Stewart Revisited?, 24 U.
MLMik L. REv. 681, 692-93 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Gold].
51. 341 U.S. 593 (1951), cited in 63 YALE L.J. 372, 379 (1954).
52. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) reads in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the pur-
poses of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid
or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws.
Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970) reads in pertinent part:
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[W]e feel that the 12,000 growers here involved are in practi-
cal effect and in the contemplation of the statutes one "organi-
zation" or "association" even though they have formally organ-
ized themselves into three separate legal entities. To hold oth-
erwise would be to impose grave legal consequences upon or-
ganizational distinctions that are of de minimis meaning and
effect to these growers who have banded together for processing
and marketing purposes within the purview of the Clayton and
Capper-Volstead Acts. There is no indication that the use of
separate corporations had economic significance in itself or
that outsiders considered and dealt with the three entities as
independent organizations. 3
The Timken decision regarded market division by affiliates. Divi-
sion of markets is a per se offense, and the application of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine in this setting drew a sharp dissent
from Justice Jackson. 4 The named appellant, Timken, was accused
of conspiring with British Timken and French Timken, its subsidi-
aries, to divide world markets for roller bearings. The agreements
to divide markets had originated between appellant and British
Timken's predecessor before 1910, while the companies were unre-
lated competitors. These agreements persisted through 1927 when
appellant and an English businessman seeking investment oppor-
tunities purchased all of British Timken's outstanding stock. The
following year, appellant organized French Timken, and made fur-
ther territorial assignments with it. Since these affiliates had always
behaved as competitors, and two had originally been independent
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products. . . may act together in
associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively pro-
cessing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign com-
merce, such products of persons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing
agencies in common; and such associations and their members may make the neces-
sary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes ....
The Supreme Court discussed the above-quoted exemptions in Md. & Va. Milk Producers
Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). In response to the Association's claim that these
sections were meant to wholly exempt cooperatives from the antitrust laws, the Court stated
that "[in the early 1900's, when agricultural cooperatives were growing in effectiveness,
there was widespread concern because the mere organization of farmers for mutual help was
often considered to be a violation of the antitrust laws." Id. at 464. The court also stated
that this result was the only end sought to be avoided by these sections. Id. at 465. It should
be noted that a similar provision exists with regard to incorporated subsidiaries, i.e., Clayton
Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
53. 370 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added).
54. 341 U.S. at 606.
Vol. 14: 63
Comment
competitors in fact, it has been suggested that the Court probably
intended its holding to reach only those situations where the affili-
ates held themselves out as competitors-and perhaps, only where
they had once competed in fact.55
Since Kiefer-Stewart, another Supreme Court decision has been
rendered which has given rise to further debate on a possible com-
petitor limitation. Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp. ," held that a parent, International Parts, could conspire with
its subsidiary, Midas, and other subsidiaries to violate § 1. In
Perma-Life Mufflers, numerous § 1 violations were alleged by the
plaintiff, a Midas Muffler Shop dealer, including resale price-fixing
and requiring dealers to purchase all exhaust system parts from
Midas. The case has been cited, without elaboration, in support of
a competitor limitation. Yet the case is not clearly supportive of
the limitation, since there was a factual dispute as to whether or not
International Parts and its subsidiaries were either competitors or
apparent competitors. It has been suggested, by respectable author-
ity, that the opinion is susceptible of such interpretation but only,
of course, if the Court had resolved the factual controversy sub
silentio by finding competition ."
There are a number of lower court cases that address the question
of whether a competitive stance is required in order to find a con-
spiracy between affiliates. In two cases, the question was not
squarely before the court, but it was suggested that the issue would
be a proper one for consideration on an adequate record. 9
The earliest case denying that a competitive posture should be
55. 63 YALE L.J. 372, 381 (1954).
56. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
57. Gold, supra note 50, at 692.
58. Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual Antitrust
Review, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 182, 183-85 (1969).
59. TV Signal Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F.2d 1256, 1260 (8th Cir. 1972); Amer-
ican TCP Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 208, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In the latter case,
which arose on motions to strike allegations, the court, in denying the motion, noted that a
competitive posture might be relevant. In the former case, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
lower court dismissal of plaintiff's action for treble damages, stating that the existence of a
competitor limitation was a "substantial question," which required actual facts, rather than
the bare pleadings, for determination. It noted that the Seventh Circuit had rejected such a
limitation in Tamaron Distrib. Corp. v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1969), and in United
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941). The latter case will be dis-
cussed below, but it should be noted that the former case, although analogous, is not strictly
on point, as it involved a manufacturer and its noncompeting agent.
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required for the imposition of liability for conspiracy between affili-
ates is United States v. General Motors Corp.0 General Motors and
its noncompeting subsidiary, General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion (GMAC) were charged with forcing General Motors dealers to
finance through GMAC. The court of appeals rejected General
Motor's argument that "a combination of competing units is essen-
tial to conspiracy under the Sherman Act." The court stated,
"Clearly a vertical combination or combination of non-competitors
may conspire to restrain unreasonably the interstate trade and com-
merce of third parties and thereby subject themselves to the prohi-
bitions of the Sherman Act."6' It must be remembered, however,
that this case pre-dates Kiefer-Stewart, so its precedential value
can not be considered an ultimatum on this point.
A more recent case rejecting a competitor requirement is Battle
v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co."2 In Liberty National an
action was brought by a funeral director against an insurer which
had issued burial policies and its wholly-owned subsidiary which
supplied merchandise and services required by the policies. The
subsidiary contracted with funeral homes, making them "author-
ized" suppliers under the policies. An insured using an authorized
home was entitled to much more under the policy than one going
to an unauthorized home. The court stated that although competi-
tion between the defendants would tend to establish that they were
independent parties, lack of competition would not render them
incapable of conspiring to their mutual benefit. 3 This case appears
to unequivocally reject a competitor requirement, yet it is somewhat
confusing in its failure to cite or discuss Hudson Sales Corp. v.
Waldrip,"4 an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion which was apparently
contrary. Liberty National also raises eyebrows by relying on
Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co.," a Second Circuit case which is
strong authority for a contrary result. One can only speculate as to
the ultimate impact of Liberty National in light of these considera-
60. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
Another early case, Ozdoba v. Verney Brunswick Mills, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 136, 138
(S.D.N.Y. 1946), held more broadly that "non-competitors or members of an affiliated group
may conspire."
61. 121 F.2d at 404.
62. 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 44, citing Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
64. 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954).
65. 316 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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tions, but it is suggested here that it may fit within an alternative
limitation, e.g., use of the subsidiary relationship specifically to
achieve an anti-competitive result.
Of the cases which support a competitor requirement, Hudson
Sales Corp. v. Waldrip6 is among the oldest. Plaintiff, a Hudson
automobile dealer, alleged that defendant Hudson Motor Car had
conspired with its wholly-owned subsidiary, Hudson Sales, to force
plaintiff to deal only in Hudson products. The court hesitated to
find the defendants, who did not compete, capable of conspiring. It
analogized the parent-noncompeting subsidiary relationship to the
corporation-individual agent relationship in which it had earlier
held a conspiracy impossible. 7 As noted above, the present status
of this case is questionable in light of Liberty National.
The Ninth Circuit apparently has endorsed the competitor limi-
tation in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Li-
quors Ltd. 8 In addition to recognizing the competitor requirement,
the opinion is otherwise noteworthy for overturning the district
court finding that unincorporated divisions are capable of Sherman
Anti-Trust Act conspiracy; thus the competitor aspect has fre-
quently been ignored. The case arose as a treble damage action by
a wholesale liquor distributor against several related distilleries for
termination of its distributor contract. The claim under § 1 was
group boycott, a per se violation.
In determining whether the defendant affiliates could conspire,
the lower court had concentrated on the degree of autonomy of each.
One factor considered was competition. The district court, however,
applied its autonomy test not only to the separate corporate defen-
dants, but to their divisions as well. Thus the "substance, not form"
rationale justified finding conspiracy between business branches
that were not even legal entities. 9
The lower court had charged the jury with regard to two of the
defendants, Barton and its subsidiary, Barton-Western, that since
the two did not compete, they were to be viewed as one entity.70
66. 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954).
67. 211 F.2d at 273, citing Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th
Cir. 1952).
68. 416 F.2d 71, 81-82 (9th Cir. 1969).
69. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915
(D. Hawaii 1967).
70. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 80 (9th
Cir. 1969).
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Although the court of appeals rejected the idea of an intra-corporate
conspiracy, it approved that part of the district court's opinion
which would require competition as a measure of sufficient auton-
omy for a conspiracy between incorporated affiliates.7 The court
stated:
Surely a manufacturer and its . . . distributor, whether a sub-
sidiary or an independent, can agree to transfer their business
from one wholesaler to another without running afoul of the
group boycott per se rule, in the absence of some forbidden
anti -competitive or monopolistic objective.7
It should be noted that this language is broad enough to have an
impact outside the intra-enterprise conspiracy area.
Although the case was decided in the context of a per se violation,
and may be intended to only apply in such instances, the authorities
cited are more universal.73 Since the per se violations are the most
extreme examples of the problems with intra-enterprise conspiracy,
however, and offer the clearest opportunity for abuse, a reading of
the case which limits it to its facts would offer some alleviation.
Probably the most thorough judicial discussion of the competitor
requirement appears in Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co. 4 Plaintiff
there had entered an agreement with a subsidiary of Kidde for the
distribution of the subsidiary's products. At the same time it en-
tered an oral understanding with the subsidiary that it could handle
Kidde products, as well. Both Kidde and its subsidiary later refused
to deal with plaintiff, who alleged a per se group boycott under § 1.
The district court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor,
since the only conspiracy alleged was between Kidde and its wholly-
owned subsidiary. The court refused to extend the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine, distinguishing Kiefer-Stewart "on the crucial
ground that the conspiracy in that case was between two competing
subsidiary companies."75 The court concluded its discussion by
quoting with approval the Willis and Pitofsky article, stating that
its decision was prompted by the need to limit the intra-enterprise
conspiracy principle."
71. Id.
72. Id. at 81-82.
73. E.g., Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38.
74. 316 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
75. 316 F. Supp. at 1325.
76. Id. at 1326.
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A final case in support of the competitor limitation of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine is Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron
Corp." This case arose as an appeal from summary judgment in
defendants' favor. The Third Circuit affirmed per curiam on several
unrelated grounds, but stated in a footnote that "ample authority""8
existed for holding that no § 1 violation was possible, since one of
the defendants, Clev-Dent, was a division of Cavitron and the other
defendants, Coles (a Cavitron subsidiary) and Cavitron, had never
held themselves out as competitors. 9 Obviously, this footnote is
only an aside on Third Circuit thinking, since the question was not
squarely before it; still the language is there and strongly indicates
approval of the competitor limitation.
As the cases discussed here suggest, the trend in the lower federal
courts has been to embrace the competitor limitation where the
question has arisen.s° It is urged that this result comports with the
legislative scheme of reserving § 1 liability for cases where indepen-
dent competitors have combined to restrain trade, except for narrow
and compelling circumstances."'
B. Abuse of the Subsidiary Structure
This limitation of intra-enterprise conspiracy is premised on the
fact that many legitimate business reasons exist for adopting a sub-
sidiary method of doing business which the antitrust laws were
never intended to thwart.8 2 However, where the subsidiary structure
is selected specifically for achieving an anti-competitive result, no
77. 461 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972).
78. The court, at 461 F.2d at 1094-95 n.1, cited Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969); Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co.,
316 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); and the "competitor" language of Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
79. 461 F.2d at 1094.
80. Apparently contrary is George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc., 508
F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974). Frequently, the applicability of such a limitation is not raised
or discussed. E.g., Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602, 606 (E.D. La.
1958). In other cases, a similar argument has been made successfully which is not tied to a
generally-applicable competitor limitation, but to a consideration of the sum-total of the
facts. E.g., I. Haas Trucking Corp. v. New York Fruit Auction Corp., 364 F. Supp. 868
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
81. See, e.g., McQuade, supra note 33, at 184-85, discussing the legislative allocation of
burdens and benefits in the antitrust laws.
82. See authorities cited at note 34, supra. See also Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38, at
26-28.
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good reason exists for insulating the components from liability for
that behavior. Accordingly, ability to conspire would be found be-
tween affiliates whose very affiliation was motivated by a desire to
restrain trade. The leading exponents of this narrow application of
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine are Willis and Pitofsky.8 3
In support of their thesis, Willis and Pitofsky discuss the Supreme
Court opinion of United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 4 In that case, it
was alleged that defendants had conspired to monopolize the sale
of cars to principal cab companies in Chicago, Pittsburgh, Minne-
apolis and New York, and the furnishing of cab services in Chi-
cago.85 Parmalee, the parent-defendant, had acquired or organized
subsidiaries holding 100% of cab licenses in Pittsburgh, 58% in Min-
neapolis, 15% in New York and 53% in Chicago."8 The Court found
that an unreasonable restraint on commerce
may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who are
affiliated or integrated under common ownership as from a
conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent. Simi-
larly, any affiliation or integration flowing from an illegal con-
spiracy cannot insulate the conspirators from the sanctions
which Congress has imposed. 7
In discussing the theory of the complaint, the Court stated:
The complaint charges that the restraint of interstate trade
was not only effected by the combination of the appellees but
was the primary object of the combination. The theory of the
complaint . . . is that "dominating power" over the cab oper-
ating companies "was not obtained by normal expansion to
meet the demands of a business growing as a result of superior
and enterprising management, but by deliberate, calculated
purchase for control. '8
Willis and Pitofsky point out that such a limitation on the intra-
83. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 38.
84. 332 U.S. 218 (1947) as cited in Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 39.
85. 332 U.S. at 220.
86. Id. at 221.
87. Id. at 227.
88. Id. at 227-28, quoting United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920). As Willis
and Pitofsky indicate, the existence of other, broader language interspersed with the above-
quoted language makes the limitation debatable, but the Court removed all doubt by nar-
rowly construing the Yellow Cab holding in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 520-22 (1948). See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 40.
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enterprise conspiracy doctrine is in keeping with the settled anti-
trust principle that an otherwise lawful business practice may be
prohibited if undertaken for improper motives, but note that such
conduct would probably be reachable under § 2 in any event. 9 Yet,
the fact that § 2 may generally be available to reach the same
violations covered by this limitation does not negate the very real
possibility that the additional availability of § 1 may be desirable
from the prosecutor's viewpoint for strategical and procedural rea-
sons 90
Another author advanced a similar thesis as a possible rationale
for the district court opinion in the Hawaiian Oke case.9 There the
Kiefer-Stewart defendants had changed from subsidiary to divi-
sional structure to avoid the force of the Supreme Court decision.
The author's thesis was that this would constitute an impermissible
motive. Although the much-discussed opinion was ultimately re-
versed by the Ninth Circuit,9" thus settling for the time-being the
question of the validity of Seagram's motives, the other cases cited
by the student commentator for the broader principle that some
motives may invalidate otherwise lawful conduct remain notewor-
thy.
Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metal Co.," the first case
cited by the commentator, is a somewhat confusing opinion due to
its repeated references to an acquisition as a "merger" and to the
supposed inability of affiliates to conspire as "Intra-Enterprise Con-
spiracy." However, the holding clearly is that liability will be im-
posed "because the alleged conspiracy took place before the
[acquisition] and the [acquisition] did not stop the conspiracy."94
89. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 41.
90. See, e.g., 63 YALE L.J. 372, 373-74 (1954).
91. 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 607, 611 (1968), discussing Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967).
The district court noted that the defendants were fundamentally the same parties that the
Supreme Court had held capable of conspiring in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1965). Since that decision, the corporate structure at Seagram
had changed from incorporated subsidiaries to unincorporated divisions, apparently in an
effort to avoid similar antitrust difficulties in the future. The court noted that the divisions
operated in virtually the same manner as the subsidiaries had, and that the structural change
had been purely formal.
92. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 81-82
(9th Cir. 1969).
93. 238 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
94. Id. at 564.
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The second case cited by the author is Beacon Fruit & Produce
Co. v. H. Harris & Co. ," involving a true intra-corporate, as opposed
to intra-enterprise, conspiracy. The only alleged conspirators were
the corporation, its directors and officers. In denying defendants'
motion for summary judgment, the court relied on plaintiffs' charge
that the individual defendants in fact "conspired to form the defen-
dant corporation as a mere instrumentality" in order "to take over
the partnership business as a step in securing control of the market
and imposing a restraint of trade for their individual benefit."'96
A more recent case illustrative of the proposition that bad motives
for establishing subsidiaries may expose the enterprise to intra-
enterprise conspiracy charges is Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Re-
tail Credit Co.," a private treble-damage action brought by a corpo-
ration engaged in non-local credit reporting. The named defendant
Retail Credit Co. (RCC) was characterized as "a dominant force in
the market of insurance credit reporting." '98 The allegations charged,
inter alia, that RCC had a monopoly in insurance credit reporting
and was utilizing that dominance as a tool to secure a monopoly of
credit reporting generally and to drive plaintiff out of business.9 It
was alleged that RCC had acquired 100 credit bureaus in a five-year
period, and had launched a new subsidiary "purely for predatory
purposes."' ' Injunctive relief was sought, as well as divestiture of
all bureaus acquired within the preceding four years.
The court declined to find a price-fixing violation for lack of evi-
dence of a "corrupt agreement" or of any agreement between RCC
and its subsidiaries in this regard. It recognized, however, that
under Supreme Court decisions, such an agreement was possible
between affiliates. 10 Thus, the court refused to find a per se § 1
violation due to lack of evidence of a conspiracy, a strange result in
light of Kiefer-Stewart,102 where the evidence of an agreement be-
tween the defendants was hardly more convincing. This result may
signify uneasiness with per se charges in this area.
It is clear that the court did find a § 2 violation in RCC's ac-
95. 152 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1957).
96. Id. at 704.
97. 358 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
98. Id. at 785.
99. Id. at 786.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 787.
102. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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tions,'°3 and probably a § 2 violation by intra-enterprise conspiracy,
since many of the wrongful acquisitions were made by RCC subsidi-
aries, rather than directly by RCC. Whether the acquisitions were
also found to constitute a § 1 violation is not really clear from the
opinion. Section 1, of course, was unnecessary to reach the alleged
conduct here, in light of the holding under § 2. The finding that
RCC used the subsidiary structure to achieve an anticompetitive
result is clear. The court noted that RCC and its subsidiaries had
acquired more than 100 credit bureaus within a very brief period.
It found the conclusion "inescapable" that these very acquisitions
had been motivated by a desire to eliminate competition.' 4 The
court granted the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff, but dec-
lined to order divestiture for policy reasons. °5
Application of the intra -enterprise conspiracy doctrine in the nar-
row situations where the motivation behind the affiliation itself was
restraint of trade is a sensible restriction on the doctrine.10 In such
cases, the relative ease of proving a "conspiracy," due to the affilia-
tion, is less likely to constitute a prosecutorial abuse than in the
normal, legitimately-conceived parent-subsidiary structure.
C. Internal Decision Limitation
This "exception" really exists in more than one version, depend-
ing upon its proponent's feelings toward intra-enterprise conspiracy.
All versions start with the premise that "purely" internal policy-
making cannot be viewed as a conspiracy to unreasonably restrain
trade. Beyond this premise, however, the limitation is perhaps too
loosely defined to even constitute a "test." It more closely resembles
a review of the total factual setting to determine whether enough
indicia are present to label internal discussions "conspiracy." There
is, of course, no exact cut-off point at which a court must apply a
103. 358 F. Supp. at 791, stating: "The evidence clearly leads to the conclusion that RCC
is a monopolist, that it has deliberately traveled a course which will enable it to maintain
that monopoly, and, consequently, has run afoul of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in that
regard."
104. Id. at 787.
105. Id. at 797.
106. This restricted application also comports with very early Supreme Court cases in this
area, such as United States v. Northern Sec. Co., 120 F. 721 (C.C. Minn. 1903), aff'd, 193
U.S. 197 (1904). There, Great Northern and Northern Pacific, theretofore competing rail-
roads, had been acquired by the defendant, Northern Securities. See discussion of this and
other early cases by Kramer, supra note 6, at 137.
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conspiracy label. How many factors must be present-and which
factors are relevant-depends upon the predilections of the judge.
The major factor to be considered is the type of decision entered
into by affiliated corporations. "Normal" internal decisions, such as
termination of distributor agreements, 7 pricing, 08 or advertising
policy of newspapers,'"9 under this view should be presumptively
proper matters for unified action by the multi-corporate enterprise
and accordingly beyond the prohibition of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. Those who oppose the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
would probably stop here, and state that the principle of per se
violations should certainly never apply to internal decisions. Some
opponents of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine would go still
further, and require a showing of (a) appreciable impact outside the
corporate family (i.e., an "unreasonable" restraint of trade) and/or
(b) specific intent to create such a restraint, before applying the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine."' Others would not apply the
doctrine even if both factors were present, but persist in calling this
an internal, nonconspiratorial decision unless the affiliates were
held out as competitors or their very affiliation was motivated by a
desire to restrain trade."'
The proponents of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, on the
other hand, would look to the external impact created by the inter-
nal decision. If there has been an impact on outsiders, the propo-
nents would apply the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. Thus
external impact becomes the triggering mechanism for applying the
doctrine. This result is justified, not because the affiliates have
stopped functioning as a unified enterprise in internal decision-
making, but because at the point that harm to outsiders results, it
becomes unimportant whether the old technicality of a plurality of
actors is satisfied. Since all internal decisions have some impact
outside the corporation, the opponents of the "external impact" test
see it as virtually no test at all-so vague and capable of arbitrary
107. E.g., Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973);
Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954).
108. E.g., United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 69,619, at 76,493
(N.D. Okla.).
109. E.g., America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
328 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
110. See, e.g., Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel's Distillery, 207 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Cal.
1961).
111. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 48-49.
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stretching as to provide no notice to those who must comply with
it."2
A representative case is Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniel's
Distillery."' This was a private action brought by a former Jack
Daniel's distributor, who sought an injunction to prohibit the manu-
facturer and its corporate affiliate from marketing its whiskey
through others. Plaintiff argued that the termination of its exclusive
distributorship constituted a group boycott per se. The court, while
acknowledging the availability of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine, rejected the claim, stating:
[Ilt is doubtful that mere concert of such affiliates for the
purpose of exercising their right, as a single business unit to fix
the price of the product or select a chosen distributor, and
nothing more, constitutes a per se anti-trust violation."4
The court concluded that in such a situation, there should be a
showing that either (a) the affiliates were not merely acting as a
unified business or (b) that any impact created by their actions was
actually unreasonable."5
Another case containing an especially thorough discussion of this
"impact" test is In re Penn Central Securities Litigation."' There
minority shareholders of Great Southwest Corporation (GSC) sued
Pennco, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Penn Central Railroad, for
alleged Securities Exchange, Sherman Anti-Trust, and Clayton Act
violations. The alleged § 1 violation was that Pennco had conspired
with its subsidiaries (including GSC, the vast majority of whose
voting stock was held by Pennco) to divide markets, a per se viola-
tion."7 The court in dismissing for failure to state a cause of action
noted that this was "not the normal intra-enterprise conspiracy
112. Any cooperation or coordination between components of a multi-corporate
enterprise can adversely affect the trade of outsiders if those outsiders happen to be
suppliers, customers, or competitors of the corporate unit. For example, simple price
coordination between corporate components could adversely affect purchasers who
must pay a higher or lower price depending on the intra-enterprise decision or competi-
tors of the components who must meet or be undercut by a lower price depending upon
that decision.
Id. at 49.
113. 207 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
114. Id. at 137-38.
115. Id. at 138.
116. 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
117. Id. at 1165.
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problem," involving actions directed against strangers to the corpo-
rate family." 8 The court held that internal management decisions
by a parent regarding only the conduct of its subsidiaries' businesses
was not within the purview of § 1.119 It also rejected the argument
that injury to the minority shareholders of a subsidiary was an
actionable external impact.' 0
The "internal decision" limitation, in its most basic form, is here
endorsed as a means of dealing with one of the greatest shortcom-
ings of the intra -enterprise conspiracy doctrine-the danger that per
se liability will be invoked by the disgruntled in order to convert a
routine internal decision into an antitrust violation. Termination of
a distributorship, as in the Alpha Distributing case, or other refusals
to deal are especially vulnerable to this type of abuse. The tempta-
tion to secure through antitrust litigation a measure of revenge, not
to mention treble damages, is understandable. This same suscepti-
bility to abuse inheres in the "external impact" formulation of this
limitation (i.e., treating impact on outsiders as a triggering mecha-
nism to invoke the doctrine). For this reason, the external impact
version of the internal decision limitation is not believed to offer
sufficient protection against improper application to merit its adop-
tion.
A recent case from the District of Columbia has further delineated
the scope of the internal decision limitation. Chastain v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.' was a private action brought by fif-
teen unaffiliated individuals and businesses engaged in distribution
of a mobile telephone unit. Plaintiffs charged defendant American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) and its operating subsidiaries
(the Bell System) of engaging in a group boycott of plaintiffs' prod-
uct. The court briefly reviewed the evolution of the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine, noting that courts had rarely found such a
conspiracy, and even then, only where a full record of the facts
"either expressly or by necessary implication" established "that the
corporations had acted without a legitimate business purpose and
with anticompetitive intent." 2 ' This review of the doctrine's appli-
cation convinced the court that a factual record would be required
118. Id. at 1166.
119. Id. at 1167.
120. Id. at 1167 n.4.
121. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) 60,519, at 67,294 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1975).
122. Id. at 67,300.
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in order to determine whether a conspiracy had occurred. Specifi-
cally, a finding of conspiracy would depend upon whether the Bell
System had adopted its course of conduct with anticompetitive in-
tent "and if the policy exerted an effect substantially similar to that
of a conspiracy among independent companies in restraint of
trade."'' 3 In effect, the court would thus require that an enterprise's
internal decision be tainted with anticompetitive intent and have
substantial "external impact" before labeling the decision an intra-
enterprise conspiracy.
D. The "One-Man Show" Exception
This possible exception is of much more limited practical applica-
tion than the foregoing exception for noncompeting affiliates, but is
of crucial importance to sole entrepreneurs who choose to do busi-
ness through a corporate structure. In brief, the "one-man show"
exception provides that no § 1 conspiracy can be possible where
incorporated affiliates share the same sole shareholder, and this
individual serves as the exclusive decision-maker on behalf of his
affiliated corporations.' 4 The exception is premised on the obvious
truth that one individual, although functioning through multiple
corporate entities, is incapable of conspiring with himself. In this
world of "form turned substance and substance turned form"'2 the
application of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine to a single-
person operation appears especially ridiculous. Because of this nar-
row premise, the exception obviously does not extend to situations
where the sole shareholder is a holding company with multiple
stockholders rather than an individual. In such cases, there will
almost certainly be multiple individual participants in the decision-
making process. There are those, however, who advocate a uniform
rule to apply both to the case of a sole individual shareholder and
to a sole incorporated shareholder.'26
Several cases have been decided on this exception. An early deci-
sion was Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co.,'
where a private action was dismissed for lack of evidence that the
activities of the two defendant corporations had been directed by
123. Id.
124. Annot., 20 A.L.R. FED. 682, 695-96 (1974); Barndt, supra note 12, at 188.
125. Krause, supra note 6, at 929.
126. E.g., Annot., 20 A.L.R. FED. 682, 696 (1974).
127. 94 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md. 1950) aff'd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951).
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any one other than Thomas Goldberg, the president and chief exec-
utive of both corporations. "8 Although Goldberg's wife owned the
corporations jointly with her husband, there was no evidence that
she participated in decision-making, nor that other officers or
agents of the corporation participated. "' Apparently contrary deci-
sions were distinguished by the court since "in each case the corpo-
rations had two or more agents or officers.' 30
The same result as that in Windsor Theatre was reached in Rayco
Manufacturing Co. v. Dunn,13'. in which summary judgment was
granted on behalf of numerous subsidiary corporations, owned by
one individual, Joseph Weiss, who also served as their president.
The court noted:
The conspiracy complained of here is not the type at which the
statute is directed. There is no joinder of parties to control the
market or institute unlawful acts, which could not have been
done by a single corporation acting alone. From the evidence
before the court, it would appear that the subsidiary corpora-
tions and Weiss were one and the same person.'32
Apparently contrary results were reached in two cases: Phi Delta
Theta Fraternity v. J. A. Buchroeder & Co.,'3 and Koufakis v.
Carvel. 31 However, these cases can be distinguished, on the ground
that although there was a sole individual shareholder, there is no
indication in the opinions that this individual was the only agent
acting on the corporations' behalf.
The "one-man show" exception appears to be a thoroughly logical
and sensible departure from the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine. In most cases there is no good reason for treating such small
128. 94 F. Supp. at 396.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 234 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
132. Id. at 598.
133. 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966). The court found alleged conspiracy of jewelry
manufacturers and vendors to control the fraternity and sorority insignia goods business a
proper defense to infringement action. It rejected the argument advanced by the jewelry
companies that they were unable to conspire because they were wholly owned by a single
individual.
134. 1968 Trade Cas. 72,343 at 84,933 (E.D.N.Y.). The court here denied a motion to
dismiss on behalf of the individual defendant and his nine wholly-owned corporations, who
were alleged to have conspired to deprive plaintiff of his Carvel franchise. In rejecting the
argument of inability to conspire, the court merely noted that such an argument on motions
was prematurely presented.
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operations like larger enterprises. The result is in harmony with
decisions like Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert,'35 holding a sole share-
holder and agent incapable of conspiring with his corporation. The
only difference between the Goldlawr situation and those-discussed
above is the purely formal aspect of more than one incorporated
entity. In either situation there is only one actual party in a
decision-making capacity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Until the Supreme Court offers an authoritative indication of the
proper scope of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, each § 1
case involving a charge of conspiracy between affiliates will con-
tinue to present a challenge for defense counsel, who will have to
muster decisional law and sound policy arguments to avoid broad
application of the rule. Likewise, plaintiffs' counsel and prosecutors
may have a challenge in overcoming judicial resistance to the more
extensive applications of the doctrine.
Since it is recognized that some limits must be placed on intra-
enterprise conspiracy the following are recommended: (1) the doc-
trine should never apply to multi-corporate operations owned and
operated by a single individual; (2) the principle of per se liability
should not be applied; and (3) the docrine should not be invoked
against noncompeting affiliates unless selection of the subsidiary
form of doing business was motivated by the specific intent to re-
strain trade.
The foregoing review has been offered in the hope that it may be
of help to the practitioner confronted with the strange conflicts of
logic and policy that abound in the environs of the "weird doctrine"
of intra-enterprise conspiracy.'
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